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IS THE IRS ABOVE THE LAW? POTENTIAL
REMEDIES FOR TAXPAYERS DAMAGED BY
UNLAWFUL IRS CONDUCT
James T. Towe
I. INTRODUCTION
Melvin Morris, a plumber and contractor, bought eighteen
substandard buildings in San Francisco to renovate and sell. Mor-
ris relied on credit from lenders, subcontractors, and suppliers to
finance the building projects. After Morris began refurbishing in-
vestment properties, a union representative told Morris that since
Morris did not employ union labor he should expect to hear from
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Shortly thereafter, the IRS in-
vestigated and audited Morris and his wife. The IRS concluded
that the couple owed back taxes for excess depreciation deductions
taken on the buildings. While investigating Morris, the IRS in-
formed Morris's creditors of his tax liability and told creditors that
Morris would become insolvent. Creditors refused to further sup-
port the venture, and Morris lost his business.1
During their investigation, IRS agents harassed and intimi-
dated Morris and his wife. To collect amounts owed for back taxes,
the IRS unlawfully seized and levied upon the Morrises' property.
After investigating and auditing the Morrises for several years and
collecting part of the alleged deficiency, the IRS realized that the
Morrises had properly computed and paid their taxes. The IRS
conceded that the deficiency determination was an error and re-
turned the wrongfully seized property. The Morrises sued for,
among other things, lost business opportunity, but their claims
failed because of sovereign immunity. This fact pattern is the mo-
dus operandi of the IRS,2 as evidenced by its agents in Morris v.
United States.3 The question that arises is how can a claimant re-
1. Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. This Comment focuses on the IRS because, as at least one commentator contends,
it is the world's most powerful bureaucracy. The IRS is five times the size of the FBI, em-
ploys over 123,000 people, obtains more information than any other agency, and can assess
civil penalties in a process that requires a taxpayer to prove his or her innocence. See DAVID
BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF, POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 16-18 (1989).
3. Morris, 521 F.2d at 873-74; see discussion infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
Innocent taxpayers may become entangled in costly litigation even though they pursue legal
precautions to prevent illegal IRS actions. See Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442
(N.D. Cal. 1987). In Husby, the Husbys received a deficiency notice and filed a tax court
petition, which under federal law prevents the IRS from further assessment and collection.
Despite this, the IRS assessed a $47,000 deficiency and sent out notices and demands for
payment. The Husby's attorney twice warned the IRS that further IRS actions would sub-
1
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cover damages for unlawful or tortious conduct committed by IRS
officials?.
Today a claimant's ability to recover damages is increasingly
important because of the size, strength, and growth of the federal
government. Federal officials already possess powers, privileges, in-
formation, and resources unavailable to the general public. Also,
government officials may be tempted to abuse their powers since
they remain generally immune from lawsuits." Federal officials who
benefit from additional powers should bear the responsibility for
harms caused by their negligent or intentional acts. As civil suits
deter private citizens' illegal conduct, civil suits against the govern-
ment could alter the government's illegal conduct as well. Cur-
rently, however, sovereign immunity severely limits the possibility
of successfully suing the government. Claims must be based on the
limited waivers of sovereign immunity that frequently restrict re-
covery or have broad exceptions.
This Comment explores the Federal Tort Claims Act' (FTCA)
as a waiver of sovereign immunity, its application in IRS cases,'
ject them to liability. The Husbys received four additional notices and demands for pay-
ment and the IRS filed notices of levy with the Husby's bank and stockbroker. Id. at 443.
Even after the Husbys received an injunction to prevent further IRS levies and liens, the
IRS filed another notice of levy and imposed a tax lien on the Husbys' property. The IRS
claimed all the mistakes were computer error. Id. at 444; see also Lojeski v. Boandl, 602 F.
Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1985). In Lojeski, Ms. Lojeski was living with her companion, Thomas
Treadway (Treadway). The IRS investigated Treadway and determined a $247,000 defi-
ciency (including penalties and interest) to which he objected. The IRS filed a nominee lien
against Lojeski for Treadway's alleged deficiency and seized her bank accounts without
prior notice or hearing. In 1982, an IRS appeals officer found the original assessment unrea-
sonable and abated it. Unfortunately, it took several months for the IRS to release the lien
on Lojeski's farm and return the funds taken from her account. Lojeski lost her business
and almost lost her farm because the bank threatened to foreclose on her mortgages. She
was forced to borrow money to pay her bills and lost two prospective buyers because of the
tax lien. Id. at 922-23. Lojeski sued the IRS for violating her Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights. The district court awarded her $67,000 for constitutional tort violations. Id. at 923-
24. The Third Circuit reversed. Lojeski v. Boandl, 788 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1986).
4. The IRS need not obtain judicial approval before pursuing taxpayers, and courts
have limited powers to review IRS actions. BURNHAM, supra note 2, at 60. IRS seizures for
tax liabilities are potentially damaging because the IRS need not obtain an independent
judgment or court order before seizing a taxpayer's property. BURNHAM, supra note 2, at 62.
Burnham cites a study of 50 tax practitioners asked to determine a hypothetical family's tax
liability. The study produced 50 different answers. BURNHAM, supra note 2, at 19-20. On the
basis of a General Accounting Office (GAO) study that tested IRS agents' knowledge of the
tax law, Burnham concluded that the IRS gives the public incorrect tax information one-
third of the time. The IRS could find errors in nearly everyone's tax returns; consequently,
anyone could suddenly face civil or criminal tax charges. BURNHAM, supra note 2, at 20-21.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1988).
6. Although this Comment focuses on the IRS, the potential for abuse exists in other
federal agencies. Many of the concepts which apply to the IRS also apply to other govern-
ment agencies. Also, this Comment does not intend to portray the IRS's standard operating
2
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and, where relevant, provides suggestions to future claimants liti-
gating with the IRS. This Comment also focuses on the FTCA's
exceptions which nearly swallow the general rule, referring to the
FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed by gov-
ernment officials as the general rule. Part II addresses the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Part III explores the general purposes,
functions, and operational structure of the FTCA. Part IV briefly
discusses the discretionary exception to the FTCA.7 Part V de-
scribes the tax assessment and collection exception central to
claims against the IRS.' Part VI presents a recent application of
the FTCA in Johnson v. Sawyer' and discusses the implications of
that case. Finally, Part VII suggests other potential remedies for
taxpayers.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on the English
maxim that "[tlhe king can do no wrong."1 This maxim is an out-
growth of the feudal notion that the lord of a manor could not be
sued in his own courts, and that the king, as the highest lord, en-
joyed total immunity.11 Why and to what extent America adopted
sovereign immunity is unclear, and sovereign immunity's exact ori-
gins, as applied to claims against the federal government are un-
certain.12 The ancient maxim, however, has established that the
United States cannot be sued without its consent. 3 This doctrine
often impedes claims for tortious IRS conduct because, absent a
procedure in all cases.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). The discretionary function exception (discretionary ex-
ception) is important in claims against government agencies and nearly swallows the general
rule. The discretionary exception alone warrants a separate article; the cases mentioned pro-
vide only a general background.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1988).
9. 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir. 1992), modified and reh'g en banc granted, 4 F.3d 369 (5th
Cir. 1993). Johnson involves the wrongful disclosure of tax return information and is a good
example of the FTCA's operational structure, including the exceptions the IRS relies on in
avoiding the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.
10. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *246.
11. See Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1924).
Borchard notes that "the King can do no wrong" was misinterpreted by early scholars be-
cause it actually meant that "the King was not privileged to do wrong." Id. at 2 n.2; see also
Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17-41 (1926)
(discussing the history and misconceptions about sovereign immunity).
12. See Sharon J. Kronish, Comment, Sovereign Immunity: A Modern Rationale in
Light of the 1976 Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act, 1981 DuKE L.J. 116,
116-18 (1981). Interestingly, "the king can do no wrong" remains in a country violently op-
posed to monarchy even though our Constitution does not mention the English feudal no-
tion. Id. at 118-19.
13. Id.
1994]
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statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, courts dismiss plaintiffs'
claims as jurisdictionally flawed. 4
In current claims against the United States, the government
may argue several historical justifications in support of sovereign
immunity. First, the doctrine is legitimate because one cannot have
a legal right against the body responsible for making the law from
which a legal right arises. 6 Second, taxpayers benefit from the doc-
trine by not having to fund damage awards. 6 Third, sovereign im-
munity is appropriate because allowing courts to grant relief inter-
feres with the executive branch, overstepping the separation of
powers. 17 Finally, imposing liability on the United States is con-
trary to the notion of supreme executive power and interferes with
the government's performance of public duties.18
Nevertheless, commentators have attacked sovereign immu-
nity as both senseless and unjustifiable in a democratic nation.19
Some scholars believe that when balancing sovereign immunity's
justifications against the strong interest of providing remedies to
parties injured by tortious actions of government officials, the lat-
ter interest should prevail.20 Courts have applied the doctrine,
however, to deny recovery in numerous cases.21 Although sovereign
14. See Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Kronish,
supra note 12, at 116. The FTCA and other statutes limit sovereign immunity, allowing
claimants to overcome jurisdictional defects. However, the limited waivers often do not pro-
vide claimants sufficient avenues of redress. As a result, the government's tortious and un-
constitutional actions can leave a plaintiff twice wronged.
15. See Joseph D. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Im-
munity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1946) (citing Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907)); John A. Kutzman, Comment, The King's Resurrection: Sovereign
Immunity Returns to Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 529, 531 (1990).
16. See Kutzman, supra note 15, at 531 (citing Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng.
Rep. 359, 362 (1788) (stating a preference that an individual should suffer an injury rather
than the public suffer an inconvenience)).
17. See Kronish, supra note 12, at 119; see also Kutzman, supra note 15, at 531.
18. See Kronish, supra note 12, at 119-20.
19. See Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action:
The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and
Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 419 (1970) (stating that for many years no scholar
has had a good word about sovereign immunity); see also Kenneth C. Davis, Sovereign Im-
munity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1970) (stating that the only justification is the
four-horse team: historical accident, habit, a tendency to favor the familiar, and inertia;
nothing else supports sovereign immunity); Kronish, supra note 12, at 119-120.
20. See, e.g., Block, supra note 15, at 1062. Block adds that sovereign immunity forces
the courts to use legal fictions and, more importantly, believes that "relief has been denied
against unconstitutional and unauthorized official action on formalistic and technical
grounds." Block, supra note 15, at 1060; see also Davis, supra note 19, at 384 (opposing the
view that courts should not interfere with government operations, Davis suggests courts
should address the issues confronting them, especially in cases where federal officers act
illegally).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991); Capozzoli v. Tracey, 663
4
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immunity exists in a pervasive form, claimants should challenge
the doctrine's applicability in modern cases. Since sovereign immu-
nity remains the law, claimants must rely on limited waivers like
the FTCA.
III. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Background
Congress enacted the FTCA for several reasons. First, the
FTCA waives sovereign immunity by providing remedies for per-
sons injured by the federal government's tortious acts.22 The
FTCA provides a previously unavailable avenue of recovery. Sec-
ond, the FTCA effectively eliminates or reduces the use of private
claim bills that, prior to the FTCA's enactment in 1946, provided
the only avenue of redress for governmental torts. 3 Since private
claim bills unduly burdened Congress, it believed that a statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity would provide a more effective ave-
nue of redress for injured parties.2 Finally, the FTCA preserves
government officials' individual immunity by imposing liability on
the United States.2" Under the FTCA, one who is harmed by a gov-
ernment official's negligent or wrongful conduct can sue the United
States instead of the official. The FTCA, therefore, employs legal
mechanisms similar to respondeat superior.26
F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1981); Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975). The doc-
trine's application in modern society raises several troubling questions. Does allowing the
United States to escape liability weaken our system of checks and balances? Would govern-
ment agencies operate more efficiently with the threat of liability? Is the federal purse too
small to pay damage claims? Should a plaintiff damaged by government agents be denied
recovery, essentially suffering two wrongs? Is it too burdensome to expect government offi-
cials, agents, and employees to live and abide by the same constitutional requirements and
standards of care imposed on the private citizenry? These and other questions abound in
this Comment and in any case where a claimant is injured by the government.
22. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-694 § 2, 102 Stat. 4564 (1988) (stating that for more than 40 years, the FTCA has
been the legal mechanism by which persons injured by negligent or wrongful acts of federal
employees may seek recovery) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988)).
23. Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the Discre-
tionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REv. 837, 838 n.2
(1992) (stating private claim bills work as any other piece of legislation and are still availa-
ble to parties who cannot seek redress in federal district court).
24. Goldman, supra note 23, at 838; see also Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 868
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-694 § 2(b), 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (stating that Congress intended to protect
federal employees from liability based on common-law torts committed within the scope of
employment, yet at the same time provide claimants with a remedy by allowing a claim
against the United States) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (providing that an employer
5
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B. Specific Provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity authorizes suits
against the United States for negligent or wrongful acts of govern-
ment agents, officials, or employees acting within the scope of their
employment." The FTCA requires that claims be based on the
state law where the act or omission occurred.28 Further, the United
States will be liable "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances. 2 9
Congress also imposed several statutory restrictions. First,
Congress mandated that federal district courts have exclusive ju-
risdiction over FTCA claims.3 0 Second, the FTCA is an exclusive
remedy.3 ' In other words, the FTCA precludes liability against the
individual agent for negligent or wrongful conduct that is the basis
of the federal tort claim 32 However, a claimant may pursue claims
against the individual involved for constitutional violations-" or for
federal statutory violations if the statute violated expressly pro-
vides a remedy against the individual.3 4
A claimant must overcome several hurdles in an FTCA claim
for IRS torts. For instance, a claimant should follow several impor-
tant procedural guidelines before filing in federal district court.3
In addition to these procedural requirements, the FTCA contains
numerous exceptions that eliminate the Act's waiver of sovereign
immunity.6 The two key exceptions in IRS cases are the discre-
is liable for the negligent or wrongful acts of employees committed within the scope of
employment).
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1988).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). This section also provides that the United States is not
liable for pre-judgment interest or punitive damages and that the United States reserves the
right to assert a blanket or qualified immunity defense. In many cases, federal officials can
assert individual qualified immunity, which is beyond the scope of this Comment.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2679.
33. Presumably one would file a Bivens constitutional tort claim against the individual
agent. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A), (B).
35. 28 U.S.C § 2675 (1988). A claim must first be presented to the appropriate agency
and be denied in writing. If the agency does not respond within six months, the claim is
deemed denied. In addition, damages requested from the district court cannot exceed the
amounts alleged in the claim presented to the appropriate agency unless there is newly dis-
covered evidence that was not reasonably discoverable or one is alleging or proving interven-
ing facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2675.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(h) (1988). One exception broadly excludes claims of as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
However, claims are allowed for damage caused by investigative or law enforcement officers
6
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tionary exception3 7 and the tax assessment and collection excep-
tion.3 8 The IRS primarily relies on these two exceptions to avoid
liability under the FTCA. Generally courts have broadly construed
both exceptions in favor of the United States, which minimizes a
claimant's chance of recovering3 9 Also, courts often defer to
agency expertise, refusing to second-guess agency decisions,
thereby making claims involving the IRS even more difficult.4 0
The first and foremost hurdle in an FTCA claim is overcoming
sovereign immunity. Otherwise, federal district courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over claims brought against the United States
for constitutional or tortious violations committed by agency offi-
cials and employees. 1 The exceptions, if applicable, prevent fed-
eral district courts from hearing the claims. Despite the Act's re-
quirement, the United States is not always treated as a private
individual under state law where the act or omission occurred., 2
Background case law illustrates how courts interpret the
FTCA and the exceptions. Often a court's application of the FTCA
to tort claims against the IRS demonstrates how the exceptions
have swallowed the general rule.'3
of the United States for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process,
or malicious prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The discretionary exception excludes:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exer-
cising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (excluding "any claim arising in respect of the assessment or
collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by an
officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer"). 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
39. In an FTCA claim, the United States is actually the defendant. This Comment
uses the terms "government," "IRS," and "United States" interchangeably to mean the
United States when discussing liability under the FTCA. Note that naming the IRS as the
defendant does not negate sovereign immunity, as the agents' acts still fall within the tax
exception. Spilman v. Crebo, 561 F. Supp. 652, 654-55 (D. Mont. 1982).
40. Goldman, supra note 23, at 852-53 (adding that another purpose of the FTCA's
exceptions is to uphold the separation of powers).
41. See Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that courts
do not have subject matter jurisdiction for constitutional damage claims against the United
States because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity) (citations omitted).
42. See infra parts IV-VI.
43. As one United States Supreme Court Justice stated, it may be that the "ancient
and discredited doctrine that 'The King can do no wrong' has not been uprooted; it has
merely been amended to read, 'The King can do only little wrongs.'" Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the discretionary excep-
tion as barring relief except in minor cases).
7
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IV. THE DISCRETIONARY EXCEPTION
The discretionary exception retains the United States sover-
eign immunity for "[a]ny claim... based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.""' Courts often
apply the discretionary exception to deny a plaintiff's claims
against the United States and commonly grant the government's
motion to dismiss. 4' Although frequently applied, federal courts
have repeatedly struggled with interpreting the discretionary ex-
ception and have not yet concisely defined it."' Since the discre-
tionary exception has been explored elsewhere,'4 7 this Comment fo-
cuses only briefly on cases favorable to claimants and cases
favorable to the IRS.
A. Discretionary Exception Cases Favorable to Claimants
Historically, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
discretionary exception does not apply in every case.48 Courts must
examine the level at which the government's decision was made to
determine whether the exception revokes the FTCA's waiver of
sovereign immunity."9 For instance, the plaintiff in Indian Towing
Co. v. United States sued the United States when his tugboat ran
aground, claiming that the Coast Guard failed to properly operate
and maintain a lighthouse. The Supreme Court held the govern-
ment liable and stated that agency actions at an operational level
are subject to suit.5 0 The Court noted the importance of the FTCA:
the Act should compensate victims of negligence by government
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
45. Goldman, supra note 23, at 839 n.8 (noting that the discretionary exception has
nearly swallowed the rule and has been criticized by other authors).
46. See FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051, 1053 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that the legislative
history does not define the discretionary exception and decades of litigation have not clearly
distinguished between actionable torts and immune discretion); see also Trevino v. General
Dynamics, 865 F.2d 1474, 1484 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating courts have found it impossible to
"define with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception") (quoting
United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984))
[hereinafter Varig Airlines].
47. See Goldman, supra note 23; Donald N. Zillman, Congress, Courts and Govern-
ment Tort Liability: Reflections on the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 687 (1989); D. Scott Barash, The Discretionary Func-
tion Exception and Mandatory Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1300 (1987).
48. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
49. Id. at 64, 69.
50. Id. (relying on Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which established the
planning and operational level distinction). But see United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315
(1991), more fully discussed infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 55
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officials in situations where a private person would be liable. 51 The
Court reasoned that the Coast Guard did not have to undertake
the lighthouse service, but once it did, it was obligated to use due
care to ensure that the lighthouse worked properly.52 Based on In-
dian Towing and Dalehite v. United States, a distinction exists
between planning and operational activity. A claimant suing the
IRS should argue that the tortious act or decision was made at the
operational level and, consequently, is not protected by the discre-
tionary exception.
An alternative view of the discretionary exception, in some
cases, may also favor claimants. Where specific statutes or regula-
tory guidelines require government officials to act or to not act a
certain way, the discretionary exception should not apply.5 3 In
Berkovitz v. United States, the plaintiff contracted polio from a
vaccine approved by the National Institute of Health and released
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the vac-
cine did not satisfy FDA standards.54 The Court recognized that
FDA policies and directives established a required course of con-
duct and held the discretionary function exception inapplicable
where officials neglect specific guidelines.55 The discretionary ex-
ception only applies when officials implementing a policy may ex-
ercise independent policy judgment.5 6 Thus, in a case where spe-
cific statutory or regulatory directives regarding the IRS exist, and
officials ignore the directives, a court should find the discretionary
exception inapplicable.
B. Discretionary Exception Cases Favorable to the IRS
In United States v. Gaubert, the United States Supreme
Court used broad language favoring the discretionary exception
and disallowed a waiver of sovereign immunity.5 7 Although
Gaubert did not involve the IRS, the IRS relies on Gaubert for the
proposition that any agent's tortious conduct falls within the dis-
cretionary exception; hence, the United States is immune from tort
claims. The analysis of Gaubert focuses on the Court's reasoning
regarding the discretionary exception. 8 In Gaubert, a former
51. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 68-70.
52. Id. at 69.
53. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
54. Id. at 533, 544-45.
55. Id. at 544-45.
56. Id. at 546-47.
57. 499 U.S. 315, 334 (1991).
58. For a more complete analysis and critique of the history of the discretionary ex-
ception and the Gaubert decision, see Goldman, supra note 23, at 841-52.
1994]
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owner (Gaubert) of Independent American Savings Association
(IASA) brought an FTCA claim for negligent supervision.5 ' The
federal government, acting under the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank-Dallas, took over the
bank's operation and requested that Gaubert resign from manag-
ing IASA.60 The government also required Gaubert to post a $25
million interest in real property for security and as a personal
guarantee that IASA's net worth would exceed required mini-
mums. IASA complied with the government's regulations, resulting
in a negative net worth and liabilities exceeding $400 million.61
Gaubert filed an FTCA claim against the United States for negli-
gence in appointing new officers and directors and for negligent
daily management of IASA.
Although the Fifth Circuit decided in Gaubert's favor, the
United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the discre-
tionary exception protected the regulators' conduct and involve-
ment regarding IASA.6 2 Despite its prior interpretation in Indian
Towing recognizing a distinction between planning and operational
level decisions, 3 the Court reasoned that: "A discretionary act is
one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing in that
description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning
functions.... Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy
or planning level."'6 4 The IRS relies heavily on Gaubert in propos-
ing that the exception covers all acts "discretionary in nature...
which involve an element of judgment or choice, and which are
based on considerations of public policy, whether or not they were
negligently performed." 65
59. Gaubert, 499 U.S at 319-20.
60. Concerned about Gaubert's financial dealings, the government requested that he
resign and appointed government officials to manage the bank. Id. at 319.
61. Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1989). IASA estimated its
net worth at positive $74 million preceding the takeover. Id. Gaubert personally lost the $25
million guarantee and an additional $75 million. Id. at 1292.
62. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 334.
63. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).
64. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
65. Brief for Appellant at 31, Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir. 1992) (No.
91-2763) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. In addition to Gaubert's broad holding, claimants
should be aware of previous United States Supreme Court cases that interpret the discre-
tionary exception to bar recovery. See, e.g., Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (barring
claims of wrongful death against the United States after the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion allegedly improperly certified airplanes that crashed); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953) (denying claims although hundreds of people were killed or injured from an
explosion caused by the government's negligent handling of ammonium nitrate).
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V. THE TAX ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION EXCEPTION
Like the discretionary exception, the tax assessment and col-
lection exception negates the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. In cases where IRS conduct harms someone, the IRS argues
that the tax exception protects the government from suit.6 There-
fore, analysis of the tax exception is crucial to an attorney pursu-
ing a tort claim for IRS wrongful conduct under the FTCA. Statu-
torily, the tax exception bars "[a]ny claim arising in respect of the
assessment or collection of any tax. ' 67 Generally, the government
asserts a strong interest in assuring timely assessment and collec-
tion of taxes.6 8 Because Congress passed the tax exception, the IRS
contends that courts should broadly interpret it.69 Courts have
broadly construed the tax exception's language to nearly eliminate
the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity in claims involving the
IRS.
Several courts have broadly interpreted the tax exception to
insulate the United States from tort liability. For example, the
Fifth Circuit has found the tax exception applicable to "all tax-
related claims. ' 70 In Interfirst Bank of Dallas, N.A. v. United
States, Interfirst Bank of Dallas (Interfirst) sued the United States
and the IRS under the FTCA, arguing that the IRS, when collect-
ing Condor Drilling Company's taxes, "wrongfully levied upon
property in which Interfirst had a perfected security interest. '71
The Fifth Circuit held that the government was immune from suit.
Although recognizing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
often criticized and misinterpreted, the court felt obligated to ap-
ply it because of United States Supreme Court decisions.7" The
court said that the first step in a claim against the government is
to determine whether an enumerated waiver of sovereign immunity
applies; if not, the government retains sovereign immunity and the
66. See infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2 680(c).
68. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935) (stating "taxes are the
lifeblood of government").
69. Appellant's Brief, supra note 65, at 24.
70. Interfirst Bank of Dallas, N.A. v. United States, 769 F.2d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).
71. Id. at 302. Interfirst loaned money to the Condor holding company which de-
faulted on its loan. Unbeknownst to Interfirst, Condor failed to pay withholding tax; there-
fore, when the collateral was auctioned to repay Interfirst, the IRS levied on the property
for Condor's delinquent withholding tax. When Condor filed for bankruptcy, its obligations
to Interfirst were not fully paid. Id.
72. Id. at 303 (stating the doctrine has been decried as irrational and immoral, criti-
cized on historical grounds, and "recognized by all to have little doctrinal coherence." None-
theless, the doctrine is endorsed by the Supreme Court and Congress) (citations omitted).
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court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.73
The Fifth Circuit focused partly on the FTCA's applicability
to Interfirst's conversion claim .7 The court stated that to sustain
its argument, Interfirst must overcome a "formidable obsta-
cle"-the tax assessment and collection exception .7  The court
found that the statute plainly prohibited any claim relating to the
assessment or collection of any tax and that it applied to all tax-
related claims.76 The IRS levies were, the court found, within the
scope of tax assessment and collection; accordingly, Interfirst could
not sue under the FTCA. Interfirst provides little guidance for
claimants, except it indicates that courts broadly construe the tax
exception to deny relief 78 However, the Interfirst court, in dicta,
criticized sovereign immunity, evidencing a sense of frustration
with the discretion and power it allows the federal government. 9 A
claimant should pay careful attention to the dicta and argue that
sovereign immunity denies legitimate claims to deserving parties.
In Capozzoli v. Tracey, the Fifth Circuit again broadly interpreted
the tax exception finding that the IRS could commit torts and es-
cape liability so long as the tortious conduct coincided with reve-
nue-raising activity.80 In Capozzoli, defendant Tracey, an IRS en-
gineer, was assigned to inspect some land the Capozzolis claimed
had suffered a flood casualty loss. Tracey entered the Capozzolis'
property without prior notice or permission and took photographs
of the home when Mrs. Capozzoli was home alone "clad only in her
nightclothes." 81
The Capozzolis sued the United States for damages based on
claims for trespass and invasion of privacy. The district court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment based on
the tax exception, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Capozzolis
argued that the agent's activity was unrelated to the assessment or
73. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-88 (1941)).
74. The court also considered Interfirst's wrongful levy claim. Id. at 304-06. However,
that claim is beyond the scope of this Comment.
75. Id. at 306.
76. Id. at 307 (relying on Broadway Open Air Theatre v. United States, 208 F.2d 257,
259 (4th Cir. 1953)).
77. Id. at 308.
78. Id. at 306-08. The court added that even the United States Constitution does not
waive sovereign immunity in a damage suit. Id. at 309.
79. Id. at 310 (stating, "The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suit by the innocent
and the guilty alike. The doctrine is often harsh and makes little sense in cases like the one
before us here. But it remains the law.").
80. 663 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. Cappozzoli v. Tracey, 663 F.2d at 656.
480 [Vol. 55
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collection of any tax; therefore, the exception should not apply.8
Disagreeing, the Fifth Circuit stated that Congress intended the
tax exception to protect the IRS from "liability stemming from
any of its revenue-raising activities."83 The court interpreted the
tax assessment and collection exception to include the agent's con-
duct, even though he was not inspecting the land.8 4
Illustrating the court's broad interpretation in the govern-
ment's favor, the court reasoned: "Congress retained the United
States sovereign immunity for any claim in respect of the assess-
ment or collection of taxes. This language is broad enough to en-
compass any activities of an IRS agent even remotely related to his
or her official duties."8  The Fifth Circuit held that:
even if Agent Tracey was not authorized to photograph the
Capozzolis' residence in connection with his investigation of
plaintiffs' casualty loss claim, and even if taking pictures of the
residence was a tortious invasion of plaintiffs' privacy, any claim
against the United States arising out of this incident is foreclosed
by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) [the tax exception].88
Despite such broad construction, the court concluded with sig-
nificant dicta indicating its intent not to insulate the government
from tort liability for any and all transgressions committed by the
IRS.87 The court stated that when an IRS employee engages in tor-
tious conduct wholly unrelated to the official duties of assessing or
collecting taxes, the tax exception does not apply.88
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has broadly inter-
preted the tax assessment and collection exception. 9 In Morris v.
United States, Morris lost his business after the IRS informed his
creditors that due to tax liability, Morris would become insolvent.
Subsequently, the IRS discovered its initial deficiency determina-
82. Id. at 657.
83. Id. The court added that the tax exception demonstrates the "government's strong
interest in protecting the administration of its tax system from the burden of constant liti-
gation." Id.
84. Id. at 657-58.
85. Id. at 658.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The court mentioned a caveat that torts wholly unrelated to an IRS agent's
official duties may be beyond the scope of employment, thus precluding vicarious liability
on the United States. Finally, the court stated that an IRS agent could conceivably commit
a tort sufficiently removed from assessing and collecting taxes to be beyond the tax excep-
tion yet within the scope of employment to allow a cause of action (via the FTCA) against
the United States. Id.
89. Morris v. United States, 521 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975).
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tion was erroneous.9 0
The Morrises sued the United States for damages under the
FTCA. The district court dismissed, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, focusing heavily on the fact that the tax exception denied
the court subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim."1 In ad-
dressing the Morrises' claims, the court stated that the FTCA's ex-
ceptions severely limit the waiver of sovereign immunity.92 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned, "Even assuming arguendo that the Inter-
nal Revenue agents' collection activity was beyond the normal
scope of authority and amounted to tortious conduct, we find that
the claim falls squarely within the exempted group of tort claims
arising out of tax collection efforts." 93 However, the court seemed
frustrated when stating that even though the IRS agents' conduct
was deplorable, the court lacked power to grant the Morrises
relief.94
Note, however, that the Morrises may have failed to allege a
state tort cause of action as the FTCA requires. The Ninth Circuit
hinted at this in stating that the FTCA does not create a federal
cause of action. 5 Thus, potential claimants must remember to base
their claims on torts as defined by the law of the state where the
act or omission occurred.
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit again addressed the question of
whether the tax exception barred a plaintiff's claim in Wright v.
United States.6 That case involved a malicious prosecution claim
brought against the United States and individual IRS defendants.
In 1980, Wright was indicted for failing to file tax returns and fal-
sifying information on his returns.9 Wright sued, alleging that the
indictments and IRS agent Fletcher's conduct constituted mali-
cious prosecution. 8 Consistent with other cases, the Ninth Circuit
90. Id. at 873-74. The Ninth Circuit assumed that the allegations in the appellants'
complaint were true since it was reviewing an appeal of a motion to dismiss granted in favor
of the United States. Id. at 873.
91. Id. at 874.
92. Id. (citing Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1972)).
93. Id. (citations omitted).
94. Id. (holding the claims against the individuals were barred as well because the
FTCA did not create a federal cause of action for torts committed by federal employees).
For claims against individuals, a claimant must plead independent jurisdictional grounds.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1983).
97. Id. at 1033. A subsequent indictment was filed, charging Wright with making false
statements on his 1973 and 1974 tax returns. Later, the indictments were dismissed, and the
prosecution was dropped. Id.
98. Id. Wright sued the United States, IRS agent Fletcher, an assistant United States
Attorney, and the 23 grand jurors who issued the indictment. Id. The district court dis-
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reasoned that if a claim falls within one of the listed exceptions,
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction."e However, the court
found that neither the malicious prosecution nor the discretionary
exception applied.100 Also, the court held that the tax exception
did not bar Wright's claim insofar as he stated a claim of malicious
prosecution that was specifically authorized by the FTCA. Agent
Fletcher's conduct in prosecuting Wright did not arise "in respect
of the assessment or collection of any tax." 101 The prosecution was
to criminally punish Wright, not collect his taxes.'0 2
After acknowledging the tax exception's broad interpretation,
the court said it was "disinclined to interpret the exception so gen-
erously, however, in the face of Congress' action in passing the
1974 'malicious prosecution' amendment to the FTCA."'0 Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the United States was not im-
mune from malicious prosecution claims involving agent Fletcher
since he was an investigative or law enforcement officer. 04 The
court's reasoning in Wright shows that courts do not always inter-
pret the exceptions in the United States favor. The preceding over-
view of the FTCA and how courts interpret the discretionary and
tax exceptions should assist the reader in understanding a recent
Fifth Circuit decision. Johnson v. Sawyer, decided in the tax-
payer's favor, illustrates the court's hesitancy to broadly interpret
the exceptions. 03 Johnson also illustrates the analytical method a
missed Wright's complaint without leave to amend. Id. at 1034.
99. Id. at 1034. The court first examined the malicious prosecution exception under
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), noting that malicious prosecution claims are disallowed except for ma-
licious prosecution committed by investigative or law enforcement officers. Id.
100. Id. at 1035. Once the decision was made to prosecute Wright, the conduct of
agent Fletcher implementing the decision did not fit within the discretionary exception. The
court reasoned that "Unlike the decision to prosecute, an agent's conduct, both before and
after that decision is made, is susceptible to judicial evaluation." Id. (citing Driscoll v.
United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975)).
101. Id.
102. Id. The court also stated that the tax assessment and collection exception has
been broadly construed. The court felt it would be consistent with prior cases if it did find
that agent Fletcher's role prosecuting Wright fit within the tax exception, because pursuing
individuals for criminal tax charges serves as a deterrent and facilitates the assessment or
collection of taxes. Id.
103. Id. at 1035.
104. Id. at 1036.
105. 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir. 1992), modified and reh'g en banc granted, 4 F.3d 369
(5th Cir. 1993). Johnson has an interesting case history. Summary judgment was decided in
Johnson's favor. 640 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1986). After trial, the district court again
decided for Johnson. 760 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (the trial court's opinion is used to
describe the facts). Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed and subsequently supplemented its
original opinion. 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir. 1992), modified and reh'g en banc granted, 4 F.3d
369 (5th Cir. 1993). Most recently, the Fifth Circuit modified its original holding and de-
cided to rehear the case en banc.
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court follows in deciding an FTCA claim.
VI. JOHNSON V. SAWYER
Mr. Johnson worked his way up the corporate ladder, was pro-
moted to senior executive vice president of American National Life
Insurance Company (American National), became the chief mar-
keting officer, and was named to the board of directors.10 6 Johnson
established himself as a reputable businessman, but his wife's ac-
counting methods lead to trouble with the IRS.
Several instances of "eccentric" accounting ultimately led to
the string of events resulting in Johnson's FTCA suit against the
United States.10 7 Unfortunately, Mrs. Johnson's recording and re-
porting methods caused discrepancies between recorded business
expenses and the expenses claimed as deductions.108
In the late 1970s, the IRS began to examine Johnson's tax re-
turns for 1972-75. Shortly thereafter, the IRS discovered discrep-
ancies. Agent Stone was assigned to the case and recommended
that Johnson be prosecuted for tax evasion. '0 9 Trying to protect his
wife from felony tax evasion charges, Johnson did not initially in-
form the IRS of his wife's involvement. Once her role was dis-
closed, Assistant United States Attorney Powers (Powers) offered
them a plea bargain. If Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of
106. Johnson, 760 F. Supp. at 1218. Johnson was next in line to become CEO and
chairman of the board. Id.
107. Every day when Johnson returned from work, he told his wife of his expenses,
which she recorded in daily summaries. Mr. Johnson reviewed the summaries at the end of
the week and copied them into a diary. At the end of every month, Mr. and Mrs. Johnson
copied the diary book onto accounting spreadsheets, which had separate categories for each
expense. An annual spreadsheet was tallied and given to their accountant at the end of the
year. In addition, when Mr. Johnson returned home from business trips, he informed his
wife of business expenses which were paid for by cash, check, or credit card and gave her all
the receipts. Id. at 1219.
108. Id. at 1220. Nothing in the record showed that Mrs. Johnson was motivated by
"duplicitous intent" or that Mr. Johnson knew of her recording methods before the IRS
began investigating. Generally, Mrs. Johnson did three things wrong. First, when confused
about how to account for cash disbursements, instead of listing the cash on the summary
sheet, she listed an equal amount of a personal expense on a credit card. Second, she occa-
sionally changed the numbers on a credit card receipt by increasing the amount to cover a
cash disbursement she did not know how to record. Third, sometimes she arbitrarily allo-
cated a cash disbursement to an expense category if she did not know how the money was
spent. The result was that the Johnsons took some deductions for personal expenses. The
court noted that Mrs. Johnson accurately reported amounts, but did not recognize the im-
portance of attributing expenses to the proper source. Id.
109. Id. at 1220-21. While the IRS branch in Houston and the Washington, D.C. De-
partment of Justice office investigated, Johnson passed two polygraphs. Nonetheless, the
Department of Justice recommended prosecution for tax evasion for 1974 and 1975 under 26
U.S.C. § 7201. Id. at 1221.
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tax evasion, the IRS would leave his wife alone; otherwise, both
were subject to indictment.'10
Several elements of the plea bargain arrangement structured
to protect Johnson's identity help in analyzing the reasons behind
Johnson's FTCA claim."' On arraignment and sentencing, every-
thing went as planned, and Johnson pleaded guilty to a crime he
did not commit to protect his wife and his career.'1 2 A few days
later, a journalist called American National inquiring about John-
son's conviction. The journalist had read about the conviction in
an IRS press release." ' The news release contained several damag-
ing items including: (1) Elvis E. Johnson, age 59, an insurance ex-
ecutive, pleaded guilty to tax evasion in Galveston; (2) Johnson's
home address; (3) Johnson's position as executive vice president
for American National Insurance Corporation; and (4) Johnson
was charged with claiming false business deductions and altering
documents for 1974 and 1975.114
Johnson's attorney contacted Powers, who said he was una-
ware of any news release, but if the Johnsons were damaged, they
should "sue the hell out of them [the IRS]."" 5 Johnson's attorney
warned the IRS that the press release contained errors." 6 The re-
110. The criminal information showed that Johnson understated his income and owed
$21,849.47 in tax instead of $18,374.50 as reported. Id. at 1221 n.13.
111. First, all papers in the case would use the name Elvis Johnson rather than E.E.
"Johnny" Johnson as Mr. Johnson was commonly known. Second, court documents would
list Johnson's address as that of his attorney rather than his home address. Third, the gov-
ernment would complete the pre-sentence investigation and inform the judge of the proba-
tion officer's recommendation before the information was filed. Fourth, the information
would be filed late on a Friday afternoon and immediately brought before the judge so ar-
raignment and sentencing could be completed that day and to avoid the media. Finally, the
government would not publish a press release. Id. at 1221.
112. Id. at 1221-22.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1222. An IRS memorandum stated that after litigation, the District of Pub-
lic Affairs Officer (DPAO) typically will draft a news release based on information supplied
by the investigating Special Agent. After legal action is complete, the Special Agent will
phone the DPAO with additional information to complete the news release. Id. at 1223 n.7.
Special Agent Stone phoned Sassen (the public affairs officer in Austin) to give her the
information for the news release. Sassen prepared the release and admitted she did not
attempt to determine what information was in the public record or to check the accuracy of
the information she received. Id. at 1223-24. After Johnson's attorney complained about the
first press release, another agent, Sawyer, received a recommendation from a Houston attor-
ney that the press release be retracted. Despite this, the IRS issued a second press release.
Id. at 1224.
115. Id. at 1222 (quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit 43, a tape of the phone conversation).
116. Other commentators have cited Johnson for the proposition that the IRS has
uncontrolled discretion to issue press releases, suggesting that IRS agents are unaware of
the proper procedures and often issue releases without verifying the information for accu-
racy. See Michael G. Little, Extra-Judicial Discussion of Taxpayer Information: The IRS
Bully Is Still on the Block, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1041, 1054 (1991).
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lease falsely stated that Johnson pleaded guilty to offenses for 1974
and 1975 (the information mentioned only 1975) and implied that
Johnson admitted to altering documents and falsifying deduc-
tions."1 7 Despite warnings from Johnson's attorney that another re-
lease would compound the IRS's liability, the IRS issued a second
press release, clarifying the previous release and eliminating men-
tion of the 1974 return and statements that Johnson had falsified
documents and taken false business deductions.'1 8 Shortly after
the second press release, American National asked Johnson to re-
sign from his position in Galveston." 9
Johnson sued the United States under the FTCA, claiming,
among other things, public dissemination of private information by
the IRS. The district court found for Johnson and awarded him
$10,902,117 in damages.'20 The Fifth Circuit affirmed on liability
and special damages with a modification of pension figures, but re-
manded to the district court for an explanation of how it deter-
mined emotional distress damages."' The IRS petitioned for a re-
hearing and a rehearing en banc in February 1993. In October
1993, the Fifth Circuit issued a supplement to its original opinion,
reaffirming liability, clarifying its prior decision, and granting a re-
hearing en banc.'22 The following discussion first focuses on the
Fifth Circuit's initial opinion and then clarifies how the court
amended its holding.
117. Johnson, 760 F. Supp. at 1222. Johnson pled guilty to one count of tax evasion
for his wife's accounting methods, but he did not admit to altering documents and falsifying
deductions.
118. Id. at 1222, 1224. Johnson had previously informed high ranking officials at
American National of his difficulties with the IRS. American National understood his tax
troubles and said it would allow him to continue as long as there was not a public scandal.
Id. at 1222-23.
119. Id. at 1223. The Johnsons sold their home and returned to Missouri where John-
son worked in a subordinate sales position. Since American National demoted him from an
executive position, he was forced to retire at age 65 instead of 70. Id. at 1223 n.4.
120. Id. at 1233. The court awarded $5,000,000 to cover emotional distress and all
other intangibles. The court stated, "A flourishing career was shot down over a tax defi-
ciency of less than three and one-half thousand dollars which stemmed from no desire to
cheat the Government, but only from the naive accounting procedures of a well-meaning
wife." The court also focused on testimony concerning a conversation Johnson had with an
IRS agent where the IRS agent told Johnson that getting Johnson's name in the paper
would accomplish the IRS's purpose even if it could not convict him. Id.
121. Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490, 1492 (5th Cir. 1992).
122. Johnson v. Sawyer, 4 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1993). The court, in supplementing and
amending its original panel opinion, expressly stated that the initial opinion still applies
except where expressly modified. Id. at 372 n.1. In its most recent opinion, however, the
court focused its negligence and negligence per se analyses on a negligent invasion of privacy
under Texas law. Id. at 376-82.
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A. Johnson I
1. Negligence and Negligence Per Se
In an FTCA claim, a plaintiff must prove that the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of an agent or employee of the federal
government caused plaintiff's damages. 123 The act or omission
must occur under circumstances in which the United States, if a
private person, would be liable under the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.12"'
The Fifth Circuit summarized Johnson's claim based on state
negligence principles.'25 Johnson argued that I.R.C. § 6103, which
prohibits the disclosure of return information, set the standard of
care, the violation of which was negligence per se in Texas."2 6 The
IRS responded that under the FTCA, one cannot rely on a federal
statute to establish liability since the FTCA requires a state tort. 2 "
The court, however, recognized that the Texas Supreme Court has
consistently held that "[t]he unexcused violation of a statute set-
ting an applicable standard of care constitutes negligence as a mat-
ter of law if the statute is designed to prevent an injury to the class
of persons to which the injured party belongs."' 128 Although the
court used a federal statute as establishing a standard of care, the
court found that its decision was not contrary to previous Fifth
Circuit decisions 29 because "Texas tort law recognizes per se negli-
123. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1494 & nn.9-11 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1988)).
Essentially, for Johnson to succeed he had to prove the traditional negligence elements:
duty, breach, cause, and damages.
124. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C § 1346(b) and Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 807-08 (1984)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1495. Section 6103 provides that tax "[rieturns and return information
shall be confidential, and except as authorized . . . no officer or employee of the United
States ... shall disclose any return or return information." Section 6103 also defines return
information to include, among other things, "a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or
amount of his income .... deficiencies .... whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or
will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing." Id. (citing I.R.C.
§ 6103(b)(2)(A)). A taxpayer's identity "is defined as the name, mailing address, taxpayer
identification number, or any combination thereof." Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6103 (b)(6)). The
definition of return information has been interpreted to include any information the IRS
gathers regarding a person's tax liability. See Allan Karnes & Roger Lirely, Striking Back at
the IRS: Using Internal Revenue Code Provisions to Redress Unauthorized Disclosures of
Tax Returns or Return Information, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 924, 933 n.40 (1993).
127. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1495.
128. Id. (quoting El Chico v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex. 1987)).
129. Id. at 1498. The court cited two cases for this proposition. In one case, federal
procedures in an FAA Flight Service Handbook set the standard of care under Texas tort
law. Id. at 1498 & n.28 (citing Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 282
(5th Cir. 1987)). In another case, the court found that the sale of a seed mixture forbidden
by a federal statute was negligence per se under Texas law. Id. at 1498 & n.29 (citing Gibson
v. Worley Mills, Inc., 614 F.2d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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gence when a statute or ordinance meant to protect a class of per-
sons is violated-regardless of whether that statute or ordinance
originates with federal, state, county, or city action."1 0
In Johnson, the court found that I.R.C. § 6103 imposed a
duty of confidentiality on the government that broadly prohibited
disclosure of tax return information."3 ' The government argued for
the Fifth Circuit to adopt the rule that if return information is
disclosed in a court proceeding, the taxpayer loses all privacy
rights in that information, and the IRS may release the informa-
tion."3 ' Rejecting the government's argument, the court found that
much of the information came from confidential records.133
The court next examined whether the release established a
tort under Texas law. The court determined that the IRS agents'
violations of the duty and standard of care imposed by I.R.C.
§ 6103 constituted negligence, if not a reckless disregard or a de-
liberate violation, under Texas tort law.13 4 Also, the court high-
lighted testimony from a meeting where one IRS agent told John-
son the only favorable publicity that the IRS receives is when it
"bring[s] a big one down and . . . 'your name is a household word
to thousands of people.' ,1""5 Johnson asked if the agent believed
that the IRS could convict him based on what they had from his
record; the IRS agent responded saying "'probably not, but I can
get your name in the newspapers and that will have accomplished
130. Id. at 1498 (responding to the United States reliance on United States v. Smith,
324 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1963), and Tindall v. United States, 901 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1990)).
131. Id. One commentator cites Johnson, stating the use of confidential tax informa-
tion by the IRS to bully taxpayers is analogous to extortion. Little, supra note 116, at 1042,
1045.
132. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1496. The circuits are split over whether return information
loses confidentiality after it is disclosed in a court proceeding. The government favored the
Ninth Circuit's rule that once return information is part of the public domain, the taxpayer
has no privacy right in that information. Consequently, the IRS may issue press releases
containing return information. Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989). The Tenth Circuit, to the contrary, ruled that return
information never loses its confidentiality and protection. Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899,
906 (10th Cir. 1983).
133. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1496-97 (stating that even under the Ninth Circuit's rule,
the IRS agents' disclosures violated § 6103). Since the information never lost its confidenti-
ality, the court was not required to select a rule from among the different circuits. Id.
134. Id. at 1497. The court focused partly on: (1) the conduct of IRS agent Stone, who
knew of the restrictions in the plea agreement arrangement, yet reported the information to
the Public Affairs officer Sassen, in neglecting to mention it was not to be published; and (2)
the fact that Sassen wrote the release based on Stone's information without checking
whether the information was accurate or if the release was proper. Stone also approved the
release for publication. Stone and other IRS officials knew (or should have known) better.
Id.
135. Id. at 1497-98.
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my purpose.' "136 The majority refused to allow such "trophy hunt-
ing" mentality by the IRS.1 37
To satisfy negligence requirements, the court next addressed
the causation element. The acts and omissions of the IRS agents
directly and proximately caused the release of protected informa-
tion and the resulting publicity "immediately decimated Johnson's
exemplary business career."1 8s The government argued that the re-
leases did not proximately cause Johnson's damages. 3 9 The court
refuted the government's argument because Johnson had disclosed
his troubles to several of American National's high level officials,
including the president who assured him his position would remain
unchanged and that the board did not need to be informed. After
the press releases, however, the board requested that Johnson re-
sign. This was sufficient to establish proximate cause.14
2. United States Affirmative Defenses
The government asserted several affirmative defenses, includ-
ing the discretionary and tax exception."1 The IRS argued that
Johnson's claim sounded in contract, not tort, because it was based
on a breach of the plea agreement.14 2 However, the court found
that Johnson's claim was not based on a breach of the plea agree-
ment143 and the IRS was not a party to the plea agreement be-
tween the Johnsons and the Department of Justice.'4 4 Johnson's
claim was based on the parties' plea agreement arrangement that
the information would be kept confidential.'46 The government
next argued that I.R.C. § 7217, which provided a cause of action
136. Id. (citing Johnson, 760 F. Supp at 1233).
137. Id. (adding that the IRS agents knew or should have known about § 6103's strict
requirements).
138. Id. at 1498.
139. Id. at 1500. The government argued that Johnson's conviction would have to be
disclosed in company information, therefore, American National eventually would have fired
Johnson. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1500. The Ninth Circuit has recently treated the discretionary exception as
an affirmative defense and requires the government to show that the decision was based on
sound governmental policy. See Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992).
142. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1500.
143. Id. at 1500-01. Johnson's claim was based on public disclosure of private facts
and negligence principles. Id.
144. Id. at 1501 (stating that the IRS had no privity with Johnson, and without priv-
ity, there can be no breach of contract).
145. If the private information was in the plea agreement, the information would be a
matter of public record, defeating the purpose of the arrangement to protect Johnson's
identity. Thus, many of the facts, including Johnson's true identity, are not in the plea
agreement.
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against individuals who breach I.R.C. § 6103, preempted the
FTCA claim. The court would not infer Congress's intent to pre-
empt the FTCA.146
The government also argued that the discretionary exception
barred Johnson's claim.147 The Fifth Circuit, holding to the con-
trary, strictly applied the discretionary exception and noted that it
does not encompass all acts of government employees simply be-
cause the acts involve some element of discretion. 48 The majority
exercised restraint in applying this exception to ensure that: (1)
the government is not completely immune from tort liability, and
(2) the FTCA's purposes (of providing a remedy for claimants in-
jured by the government) were not frustrated. 9 Basically, the
Fifth Circuit applied the planning and operational distinction from
previous decisions. 15  All governmental decisions carrying out a
policy are not necessarily protected; otherwise, the government
would be immune from all torts. The court concluded that at least
some of the agents' actions were not protected by the discretionary
exception. As a result, if the government adopts a discretionary
policy, the government "must thereafter exercise constant vigilance
to ensure that actions taken in furtherance of that policy are not
performed negligently. 1 51
The Johnson majority reluctantly acknowledged that the IRS,
in its discretion, decided to maintain a policy of issuing press re-
leases about people convicted of tax evasion. Generally, the discre-
tionary exception is intended to protect this kind of policy deci-
sion. However, the agents who implemented this policy either
deliberately ignored, or negligently overlooked, I.R.C. § 6103.152
146. Id. Section 7217 provided a cause of action against the individuals who released
return information but was repealed and replaced by § 7431, which allows a cause of action
against the United States for § 6103 violations. I.R.C. § 7431. Under current § 7431, the
government's preemption argument may be more persuasive. See R. Tracy Sprouls, IRC
§ § 7431 and 7433: Civil Remedies for Abusive Practices by the IRS, 1 FLA. TAX. REV. 563,
588 (1993).
147. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1502. For a discussion of the discretionary exception, see
supra part IV.
148. Id. (relying on a Fifth Circuit decision, the court stated, "our 'decisions ... have
been extraordinarily careful to avoid any interpretation of the discretionary function excep-
tion that would embrace any governmental act merely because some decision-making power
was exercised by the official whose act was questioned' ") (quoting Trevino v. General Dy-
namics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1484 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989)).
149. Id. (refusing to employ a "classic example of the exception swallowing the rule").
150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. Id. (citing Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)).
152. Id. The Fifth Circuit found the IRS agents' conduct negligent in the abstract and
negligent per se because the agents violated § 6103 statutory requirements. Id. at 1503.
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Relying on these principles, the court held that the discretionary
exception does not shield the government from liability for all ac-
tions in carrying out policies (here, to deter tax evasion) when the
IRS agents violate a federal statute, regulation, or express
policy.1 53
The government also argued that the tax exception should
nullify Johnson's recovery because publishing press releases deters
potential tax evaders, which furthers the more general purpose of
collecting taxes.154 The Fifth Circuit found the government's argu-
ment "untenable. '155
Criticizing a broad interpretation of the tax assessment and
collection exception, the court stated that a broad reading would
extend the exception so far that the "FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity vis-a-vis the IRS would be wholly subsumed in that ex-
ception."1 56 The court found no authority supporting such perva-
sive immunity and decided that the exception only applies broadly
to activities that have a realistic nexus to the functions of assessing
or collecting taxes.1 57 Additionally, the court believed that ac-
cepting the government's argument would stretch the exception to
cover all IRS deterrent activity, even though, as here, the taxpayer
may have paid the tax deficiency, penalties, and interest.'5 8
The Fifth Circuit also discussed a concept apparent in many
IRS cases but, nevertheless, not recognized in prior decisions. Re-
garding the breadth of the exception, the court stated that not all
IRS employees are engaged in assessing and collecting taxes, al-
though that is the IRS's primary purpose.'5 9 Furthermore, the
court recognized that not all official acts of agents engaged in col-
lecting or assessing taxes sufficiently relate to those functions to
have the nexus that justifies the tax exception's protection.'60
Thus, the court emphatically refused to expand the exception be-
153. Id. at 1503 (stating, "[t]he sheltering wings of the exception are broad, but not
infinite").
154. Id.
155. Id. The district court found the agents' actions beyond the scope of tax assess-
ment and collection. The Fifth Circuit agreed, stating a contrary finding "strains credulity
beyond the breaking point." Id.
156. Id. (adding that extending the tax assessment and collection exception that far
would exempt every act of every IRS agent).
157. Id. (acknowledging the broad reading in Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032,
1035-36 (9th Cir. 1983), and Capozzoli v. Tracey, 663 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1981)).
158. Id. at 1503-04.
159. Id. at 1504. The court noted that one agent was a public relations officer; the
others were special agents involved in criminal tax violations. The court stated, "Off hand,
we can think of no two IRS jobs with less nexus to the functions of assessing or collecting
taxes." Id.
160. Id. This sufficient nexus test is novel to IRS decisions.
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yond its already broad range.16' The court held that the tax excep-
tion's plain language illustrates that Congress did not intend to in-
clude deterrent publicity within the scope of the exception. '62
In conclusion, the court held that the agents had a duty of
care under I.R.C. § 6103, they breached that duty, and the breach
was negligence or negligence per se under Texas law, which is ac-
tionable under the FTCA.'e s As a result, the majority affirmed in
part, modified as to pension losses, and remanded in part to clarify
the emotional damages.16 4
B. Johnson II
In 1993, the Fifth Circuit issued a second opinion modifying
and clarifying its original opinion.'65 Two aspects of the second
opinion differ from the original opinion and require discussion.
First, the court found liability under another Texas state tort the-
ory. Overruling the district court, the majority held that Johnson
established a state tort for public disclosure of private facts based
on privacy rights.' 66 Johnson had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the disclosed return information, and the government ig-
nored the congressional determination that return information re-
main confidential.' 6 7 The government, as a result, was liable under
Texas law, just as any other private person would be for publishing
private and confidential information. The court noted that absent
I.R.C. § 6103, Johnson could assert a cause of action for invasion
161. Id. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Johnson case fit the situation described
Capozzoli and quoted the following language that:
an IRS agent could engage in tortious conduct sufficiently removed from the
agents official duties of assessing or collecting taxes as to be beyond the scope of
Section 2680(c), and at the same time sufficiently within the scope of his employ-
ment [as] to give rise to an action against the United States.
Id. at 1504 (quoting Capozzoli, 663 F.2d at 658).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1505. The court also found that the breach caused Johnson's damages. Cir-
cuit Judge Garwood filed a dissenting opinion based on several problems he felt the major-
ity overlooked or ignored. Judge Garwood sided with the government's arguments in the
discussion of the majority opinion because he believed that: (1) Johnson's claim was not
based on Texas law; (2) the released information was not confidential or, if it was, the
breach of privacy was so minimal it did not cause damage; and (3) Johnson's FTCA claim
was preempted by a more specific remedial statute. Id. at 1506-13. The majority carefully
refuted each of the dissent's concerns.
164. Id. at 1506.
165. Johnson v. Sawyer, 4 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1993). The court also agreed to hear the
case en banc. Id. at 401.
166. Id. at 374-76.
167. Id. at 375 (stating that Congress enacted I.R.C. § 6103 to protect taxpayers' rea-
sonable privacy rights).
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of privacy.""8
Second, the court clarified a previous mistake both it and the
district court made when using I.R.C. § 6103 to establish a duty.
The court stated that under Texas law, courts can adopt a stan-
dard of care from a statute to measure the care owed to others
under a state common-law duty."6 9 Using a federal statute as a
standard of care is consistent with previous Fifth Circuit
decisions. 170
The court concluded that the district court erred in not up-
holding FTCA liability on Johnson's invasion of privacy claim and
found that the government owed a common-law duty, as any pri-
vate person in like circumstances, to act as a reasonable person. 17 1
Consequently, the court reaffirmed its prior holding based on neg-
ligence and negligence per se and modified its holding based on
privacy tort notions.1 72
C. Johnson's Impact
The majority decision in Johnson illustrates that courts are
beginning to step back from sovereign immunity's broad applica-
tion. Johnson also demonstrates that courts will not always allow
the FTCA's exceptions to swallow the general rule. Consequently,
Johnson has established precedent that other courts may follow. 17 3
168. Id. at 377-78.
169. Id. at 376-77. The court found that § 6103 did not establish a duty. The duty not
to disclose private and embarrassing facts is owed by any reasonable person under state
common law. Section 6103 was used to measure the appropriate standard of care under the
common-law duty. Id.
170. Id. at 378 (relying on Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278,
282 (5th Cir. 1987); Gibson v. Worley Mills, Inc., 614 F.2d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1980)).
171. Id. at 392 (stating that a reasonable person does not publicize damaging or em-
barrassing facts about others).
172. Id. Invasion of privacy claims are allowed in FTCA cases because they do not fall
within the exceptions. See Black v. Sheraton Corp., 564 F.2d 531, 539-41 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(the plaintiff was a lobbyist whose hotel room was bugged by the FBI; the obtained informa-
tion was used to damage his reputation; he was subsequently convicted of tax evasion and
lost his career).
173. Courts have relied on Johnson for various purposes. See, e.g., Wilkerson v.
United States, 839 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Tex. 1993). In Wilkerson, the IRS levied on half of
Ms. Wilkerson's income to collect taxes from her alleged, then or former, delinquent hus-
band, contending the wages were community property. The IRS communicated information
about the levies to her bank, at least 35 of her customers, and other individuals. She sued,
claiming she lost her business (worth over $1,000,000) from the alleged wrongful disclosures.
Id. at 441. The court stated that based on the pleadings, it was impossible to tell whether
the disclosures to third parties were related to tax assessment or collection or done to harass
Wilkerson and ruin her business. The court cited Johnson to support its reasoning that the
tax exception may not cover the latter activity if Wilkerson's allegations were true. Accord-
ingly, the court refused to grant the government's motion to dismiss on this issue. Id. at 446;
see also Hrubec v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 829 F. Supp. 1502, 1506 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
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For example, the Eighth Circuit relied on Johnson in finding that
the violation of I.R.C. § 6103 is a tort.17' If upheld by the en banc
panel, Johnson is a significant victory against sovereign immunity.
If overturned, Johnson strongly evidences why sovereign immunity
should be eroded or eliminated. Regardless of the final outcome,
the dissent did not dispute the majority's interpretation of the dis-
cretionary and tax exceptions.
1. Discretionary Exception Post-Johnson
The discretionary exception remains confusing, and predicting
how future courts will interpret it is difficult. In cases where the
discretionary exception may apply, the decisions appear fact-spe-
cific. A claimant should be aware of the United States Supreme
Court's recent interpretation of the exception. 7 5 Although courts
often interpret the discretionary exception in favor of the United
States, this need not create an impenetrable barrier.
If a government agent's conduct is specifically prescribed by a
statute or regulation, and the agent ignores or overlooks prescribed
steps, the Berkovitz rule, rendering the discretionary exception in-
applicable, should apply." 6 Also, remnants of the planning and op-
erational distinction may still exist despite the Court's refusal to
apply that distinction in Gaubert. The Johnson court noted these
concepts from prior cases, refusing to extend protections to agents
carrying out government policies. 17 7 Even under Gaubert, the dis-
cretionary exception requires that the decision or policy be based
on considerations of public policy. 78 As in Johnson, a claimant
should argue that the government's acts were not based on public
(citing Johnson to support an award for emotional damages under § 7431 and recognizing
Johnson as a tort case).
174. McLarty v. United States, 6 F.3d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1993). In McLarty, the tax-
payer settled a previous improper use of tax returns case with the IRS. McLarty then sued
to recover his attorney's fees and expenses. Id. at 547. The IRS argued that McLarty could
not recover attorney's fees because his original claim based on § 6103 sounded in tort. The
court agreed and cited Johnson for the proposition that a § 6103 violation constitutes a
tort. Id. at 549. Apparently, the IRS conceded that violating § 6103 is a tort.
175. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991). The Court reasoned that
"[w]hen established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or
agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed
that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion." Id. This rea-
soning appears circular. Nonetheless, it obviously provides broad latitude favoring the
government.
176. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988); see supra text accompanying
notes 53-56.
177. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1502-03.
178. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323.
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policy so the exception should not apply.1 79 Finally, to avoid the
exception, a claimant should argue in favor of the FTCA's original
intent of providing relief for parties injured by government
agents.1 80 Hopefully, courts in future cases will decide that the dis-
cretionary exception is not so encompassing that it continues to
swallow the FTCA, rendering the Act meaningless.
2. Tax Assessment and Collection Exception Post-Johnson
One of the more significant aspects of the Johnson decision is
how the court handled the tax assessment and collection excep-
tion.1 81 Arguing in favor of the tax exception, the IRS relied on
previous Fifth Circuit cases that broadly interpreted the tax excep-
tion.18 2 Thus, Johnson had significant hurdles to overcome in con-
vincing the court not to apply the exception. In light of Johnson,
the Fifth Circuit may no longer support a broad reading of the tax
assessment and collection exception.
The IRS called the exception the "federal tax exception" and
implied that any tort involving the IRS is covered by the excep-
tion. ' A literal reading of I.R.C. § 2680(c), however, illustrates
that the exception only encompasses tax assessment and collec-
tion.8 The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this statute as intended
to protect the collection process from interference by constant liti-
gation.1 85 However, Johnson's attorney contended that the excep-
tions to the FTCA should be narrowly construed, 86 arguing that
Congress enacted the FTCA to eliminate traditional all-encom-
passing governmental tort immunity and to allow unprecedented
liability on the government.8 7 The court agreed, noting that the
179. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1502-03. The court was skeptical about the policy of deter-
ring tax evasion by publishing confidential information.
180. See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9 (1984). In Kosak, Justice Mar-
shall responded to the government's argument that the FTCA's exceptions should be
broadly construed by stating that "unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run
the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute." Id. (citing United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 548 n.5 (1951)). This language should apply to all of the FTCA's
exceptions.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1988) (tax assessment and collection exception).
182. See, e.g., Interfirst Bank of Dallas, N.A. v. United States, 769 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986); Capozzoli v. Tracey, 663 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1981).
183. Brief for Appellee at 21, Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir. 1992) (No.
91-2763) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
185. See Interfirst, 769 F.2d at 308.
186. Appellee's Brief, supra note 183, at 22 (citing Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d
656, 662 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983)).
187. Appellee's Brief, supra note 183, at 22 (relying on Rayonier Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1963)). Johnson's coun-
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exception is broadly interpreted, but only in cases where it relates
to agents' activities with a realistic nexus to the functions of as-
sessing or collecting taxes. 8"
Assuming, for argument's sake, that the press releases had a
deterrent purpose, the Johnson majority still held that the actions
were not "sufficiently related" to assessing or collecting taxes to
uphold sovereign immunity. 89 The court added, "It is equally true
that not every official act of those agents who are thus engaged [in
assessing or collecting taxes] is sufficiently related to assessing or
collecting taxes to have the nexus required to enjoy protection of
[I.R.C.] § 2680(c)."' 90 Though the primary purpose of the IRS is to
assess and collect taxes, the court refused to conclude that every
act of an IRS agent or employee falls within that description. 9 '
Johnson favors claimants, because the court accepted distinctions
previously not recognized.
Claimants should capitalize on the distinction that exists
among agents within the IRS. Not every agent, officer, or employee
of the IRS is involved in assessing or collecting taxes.'92 The court
in Johnson found merit in this argument, because not every IRS
agent or employee assesses or collects taxes. 93 This new approach
in reviewing the tax assessment and collection exception gives
claimants additional leverage.
Finally, to avoid the tax exception, claimants might look to
dicta in prior cases. The Fifth Circuit has raised doubts about sov-
ereign immunity, indicating its uneasiness in affording such broad
liability protection to the United States.1 94 For example, in In-
terfirst Bank of Dallas, N.A. v. United States, the court criticized
the doctrine of sovereign immunity because it bars suits by both
the innocent and guilty. Likewise, the doctrine is often harsh and
makes little sense in the United States. 9 5 In Capozzoli, the Fifth
sel added that extending the tax assessment and collection exception to include situations
where the release of confidential return information is probably a felony (under I.R.C.
§ 7213) would extend sovereign immunity to protect the IRS from intentional and wanton
acts. Appellee's Brief, supra note 183, at 22.
188. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1504. This "realistic or substantial nexus" is a novel ap-
proach to interpreting the tax exception and an argument that claimants should encourage
courts to address.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Appellee's Brief, supra note 183, at 22.
193. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1503-04.
194. See Interfirst, 769 F.2d at 310; Capozzoli v. Tracey, 663 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1981).
195. Interfirst, 769 F.2d at 310 (adding that it nonetheless remains the law so the
court was obligated to uphold it). For a discussion of sovereign immunity's application in
the United States, see supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
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Circuit recognized a limitation on sovereign immunity."9 6 Also, the
Ninth Circuit refused to apply the tax assessment and collection
exception in a malicious prosecution claim specifically authorized
by the FTCA.197 Based on dicta and direct language from previous
decisions, claimants should mold favorable language into their
FTCA claims.
3. Negligence and Negligence Per Se
The court in Johnson found that when federal officials violate
federal statutory requirements, it is negligence per se or at least
negligence. The court's holding on this issue provides additional
arguments for future FTCA claims. Since statutory violations are
negligence per se under state law and actionable against the
tortfeasor, such violations should be viable under the FTCA's plain
language.1 98 In the alternative, a claimant could argue that it is or-
dinary negligence for IRS agents to ignore statutes and regulations
in the Internal Revenue Code. 199 Thus, in cases where the IRS ig-
nores its own statutes and regulations, negligence or negligence per
se principles should apply.
VII. OTHER POTENTIAL REMEDIES
As this Comment illustrates, successfully suing the federal
government is difficult and rarely successful. '00 Claims against the
196. Capozzoli, 663 F.2d at 658. Interpreting the tax exception in favor of the United
States, the court indicated that it was not suggesting that the government is insulated from
all tort liability from IRS transgressions. A tort wholly unrelated to an agent's official duties
would not be sheltered by sovereign immunity. Id.
197. Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1983) (acknowledging that
although the tax exception had been broadly construed, the court was "disinclined to inter-
pret the exception so generously").
198. The agent's position with the government should be irrelevant.
199. The IRS should be responsible for understanding and abiding by the Internal
Revenue Code. Since IRS agents work with the Internal Revenue Code, IRS agents should
be required to comply with the Code's provisions. Private individuals, on the other hand,
often know very little about the Code, yet suffer from penalties, interest, fines, liens, levies,
or felony tax evasion charges when they violate tax code provisions. Within its discretion,
the IRS can seize a taxpayer's property for Code violations without first appearing in front
of an impartial tribunal to determine whether the IRS's assessment is proper. See BURN-
HAM, supra note 2, at 18, 43, 62. Burnham notes the strange anomaly in tax cases because
one adversary (the IRS) acts as the judge with legal authority to decide the case and can
apply penalties against the taxpayer or tax practitioner. BURNHAM, supra note 2, at 43.
200. To make the burden even more difficult, the IRS may pursue attorneys who zeal-
ously represent clients in litigation against the IRS. See United States v. Heller, 830 F.2d
150 (11th Cir. 1987). In that case, Heller, an attorney, represented a newspaper that was
reporting about IRS undercover operations. The IRS disapproved of the newspaper stories,
so two IRS agents met with Heller to discuss legal proceedings against Heller's client. The
same two IRS agents pursued Heller personally after they exchanged heated words in Hel-
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United States are time-consuming and extremely expensive." 1 The
United States has unlimited resources and staff. To enhance
chances of recovery, a claimant may alternatively plead other po-
tential claims, depending on the facts.
Other potential remedies include: Bivens constitutional tort
actions,20 2 other statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, and pri-
vate claim bills. First, for constitutional violations, a claimant may
plead a constitutional tort action against the individual agents.203
Since the individual agent is the defendant in a Bivens suit, a
plaintiff may have little chance of recovering adequate damages.
Bivens claims have been upheld for other than Fourth Amendment
violations.20 Nonetheless, Bivens tort actions have achieved lim-
ited success against the IRS205 making it difficult for a claimant to
ler's office. Heller immediately requested that the two agents be replaced by impartial
agents. The court denied Heller's request and ultimately convicted him of three counts of
tax evasion even though his accounting procedure was approved by a prior tax court opin-
ion. The IRS also forced Heller's accountant to testify falsely against him. Id. at 152-54. The
Eleventh Circuit reversed, partly because the government deprived Heller of an important
defense witness and partly because the accounting method he used was approved by prior
case law. Id. at 154-55. Heller spent at least four months in prison and later sued. The IRS
settled with Heller in February 1994, nearly 20 years after the incident began. Heller stated
that he hoped his efforts would prevent ordinary taxpayers from being treated similarly and
gave the $500,000 settlement to charity. IRS Can't Write Off Lawyer's Lawsuit, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 1994, at D6.
201. The Johnson case has been in court over ten years.
202. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(holding that a district court may award damages against federal agents for injuries plaintiff
suffered from the agents' violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights).
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green 446 U.S. 14, 16-25 (1980) (upholding a Bivens constitu-
tional tort by decedent's widow who sued based on the Eighth Amendment when her hus-
band died in prison because he did not receive proper health care); Gibson v. United States,
781 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1986) (extending Bivens to First Amendment claims). A
Bivens claim received limited success in a Montana case. See Todd v. United States, 613 F.
Supp. 552, 556 (D. Mont. 1985). On her tax return, Mrs. Todd typed that she was paying
her taxes involuntarily under penalty of statutory punishment. The IRS responded by im-
posing a $500 fine for filing a frivolous return, and Mrs. Todd refused to pay the fine. The
IRS seized her bank account and filed a tax lien on her property. The district court held
that assessing a penalty for the comment typed on her tax return violated her First Amend-
ment rights and attaching her bank account and imposing a tax lien on her property without
prior hearing violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 554-56. Todd, however, was overturned
by the Ninth Circuit. Todd v. United States, 802 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1986), superseded by
849 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1988).
205. See, e.g., Lojeski v. Boandl, 788 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing the district
court, the Third Circuit held that despite the IRS's continuous and unjustified harassment
of the plaintiff, and imposing liens and levies on her property, no constitutional or statutory
rights were violated). The ineffectiveness of Bivens suits is illustrated by a statement that
then IRS Commissioner Gibbs made in congressional hearings against the proposed Tax-
payer Bill of Rights. Commissioner Gibbs argued that taxpayers have sufficient safeguards
under the Bivens doctrine. To illustrate that IRS agents do not abuse their positions, Com-
missioner Gibbs stated that between 1980 and 1986, over 1,000 Bivens suits were filed, but
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recover for constitutional violations.0 6 The inadequacy of these
remedies illustrates that the IRS may violate constitutional rights
and yet escape unchecked by the judiciary.20 7
Second, Congress has waived sovereign immunity under sev-
eral different statutes found in the tax code.208 Perhaps most inter-
esting, and of recent debate, is the Taxpayer Bill of Rights.209 The
Taxpayer Bill of Rights was enacted, in part, as a response to hor-
ror stories by taxpayers who testified in congressional hearings.21
Although the bill appears to provide broad remedies, several fea-
tures limit its effectiveness for potential claimants.1 Section 7433
of the Code only applies to collection activities; abuses connected
with wrongful assessments, no matter how egregious, are not ac-
tionable. ' 2 Also, the statute limits claims to reckless or intentional
acts by IRS agents. 13 Damages under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights
none were successful. The commissioner testified to show that Congress should not grant
statutory waivers of sovereign immunity in IRS cases. See Sprouls, supra note 146, at 591.
206. Perhaps more difficult, but nonetheless plausible in a given case, is a § 1983
claim for civil rights violations. A § 1983 claim requires state action, so the IRS would have
to act under the color of state law or act with a state agency or officials to subject the agents
to liability. However, a § 1983 claim is likely to meet limited success and is rarely upheld
against federal agents.
207. Burnham argues that the only effective way to control the IRS is by enhancing
the nearly non-existent congressional oversight. BURNHAM, supra note 2, at 353. However,
Congress may be hesitant to effectively oversee the IRS, since the IRS has been involved in
auditing and removing congressmen who have challenged the IRS by suggesting more strin-
gent oversight. BURNHAM, supra note 2, at 291-308.
208. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7426 (1988) (allowing a third-party wrongful levy action against
the IRS); I.R.C. § 7421 (1988) (allowing, in limited situations, an injunction or judicial re-
view of specific IRS activities); I.R.C. § 7430 (1988) (providing claims for reasonable litiga-
tion costs in cases where the taxpayer prevails and the government's position in the litiga-
tion was unreasonable); I.R.C. § 7431 (1988) (waiving sovereign immunity for wrongful
disclosure of confidential tax return information); I.R.C. § 7432 (1988) (involving damage
claims when the government refuses to release a lien). The coverage and applicability of
these provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment, and these are not the only purport-
edly remedial provisions of the tax code.
209. I.R.C. § 7433 (1988). Like the FTCA, this section requires that taxpayers first
exhaust remedies with the IRS. I.R.C. § 7433(d)(1) (1988).
210. For an excellent discussion of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, its legislative history,
courts' interpretations, and shortcomings, see Sprouls, supra note 146, at 589-605. Among
those who testified was Thomas Treadway, telling Congress how he and Lojeski lost their
businesses as a result of IRS abuse. Sprouls, supra note 146, at 591 n.91. See supra note 3
for a brief discussion of the case involving Treadway and Lojeski.
211. The Act requires that an IRS agent intentionally or recklessly disregard an Inter-
nal Revenue Code provision or its regulations in connection with the collection of tax. The
disregard must proximately cause direct economic damages. See Sprouls, supra note 146, at
590.
212. See Sprouls, supra note 146, at 590.
213. I.R.C. § 7433(a) (1988). The government is not liable for negligent collections and
only needs to prove that the particular agent was unaware of the provision violated. See
Sprouls, supra note 146, at 602. Sprouls concludes that the IRS can maximize revenue by
maintaining poorly informed but zealous agents to press tax collection by proper or ir-
31
Towe: Is the IRS Above the Law?
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1994
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
are limited to $100,000 (punitive damages are not allowed), which
may not cover actual economic damages, let alone a claimant's dev-
astated credit rating 1 " and personal reputation.216 Likewise, since
I.R.C. § 7433 is the exclusive remedy in cases where it applies, the
$100,000 limit restricts recovery where the taxpayer may be able to
recover more under the FTCA or a Bivens suit. The Taxpayer Bill
of Rights does provide some remedies for taxpayers, but its short-
comings limit it as a complete remedy for damaged claimants.2 1 6
Finally, if the other remedies are ineffective or inapplicable, a
taxpayer damaged by the IRS can resort to a private claim bill. A
private claim bill works like any other legislation and, if passed,
would be a congressional award for the IRS's wrongful activity.2 17
Private claim bills are still available, despite the fact that the
FTCA was enacted to limit their use.21 ' Of course, private claim
bills are time-consuming, and Congress is not likely to respond to
all IRS abuses by enacting legislation. Thus, private claim bills
may provide little hope. Like the FTCA, other avenues of relief
have limitations for a party damaged by the IRS.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of sovereign immunity often bars claims from
taxpayers damaged or injured by tortious IRS conduct. To provide
redress for such conduct, Congress enacted the FTCA, allowing a
cause of action against the United States for the negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions of its agents and employees. On its face,
the FTCA appears to allow citizens to use the judicial system to
protect their rights. However, the discretionary and tax assessment
and collection exceptions limit the FTCA's effectiveness in cases
involving the IRS. Likewise, other potential causes of action may
proper purposes. Sprouls, supra note 146, at 602.
214. An IRS tax lien may affect a taxpayer's credit rating for up to seven years, even if
the taxpayer pays the alleged deficiency to clear the lien. See Marvin J. Garbis & James J.
Keightly, Internal Revenue Service Collection Procedures, Jeopardy Assessments, and Lit-
igation, C889 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 319, 352 (1993).
215. See Sprouls, supra note 146, at 592. Sprouls also suggests several congressional
changes to enhance § 7433 as an effective civil remedy for IRS abusive practices. Sprouls,
supra note 146, at 604-05.
216. One may believe that Rule 11 sanctions prevent frivolous IRS actions, however,
see Rule 11: Should Sanctions be Imposed Against the Government and Its Attorneys in
Federal Tax Cases? A Review and Critique of Mattingly v. United States, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 613, 613-14 (1992) (stating that although Rule 11 is a federal court rule, the United
States and its tax lawyers generally escape Rule 11 sanctions, yet aggressively pursue Rule
11 sanctions against parties who litigate with the IRS).
217. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 837-38 & n.2.
218. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 837-38 & n.2.
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not provide a sufficient remedy for IRS tortious or unconstitu-
tional conduct.
A court granting a claimant relief, as in Johnson, rarely oc-
curs. Courts frustrated with sovereign immunity should strictly
scrutinize the FTCA's waivers, breathing life into the original re-
medial purposes of the FTCA. Moreover, Congress should seriously
reconsider the doctrine of sovereign immunity and re-examine the
limited waivers currently provided.21 Perhaps, in light of recent
cases and commentary on this issue, Congress will respond and ei-
ther more effectively oversee the IRS or eliminate or limit sover-
eign immunity.
Until then, claimants should continue to urge courts to protect
their rights in FTCA claims and other cases. After all, litigation is
the time-tested mechanism by which private citizens remedy un-
lawful conduct. The mechanism should apply whether the defend-
ant is an agent of the government or a private citizen. Permitting
citizens access to the courts reaffirms the judiciary's ability to serve
as a check on executive agencies. The elimination or limitation of
sovereign immunity could transform the IRS and other govern-
ment agencies into more efficient and responsible bureaucracies.
219. History illustrates that abusive tax practices were a significant factor behind the
American Revolution and the adoption of the United States Constitution.
1994] 501
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